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Abstract 
This article examines political sectarianism as institutionalized in the consociational power sharing arrangements of 
Lebanon.  The proposition advanced in this article challenges the common belief that the sectarian model of 
corporate consociationalism is adequate for plural societies undergoing democratic transition.  It demonstrates that 
demographic, spatial, and regional power shifts render corporate sectarian power sharing consociationalism 
conducive to conflict and national fragmentation. As an alternative, it proposes ‗integrative consociationalism‘ as a 
more responsive governing option that accommodates national and community-based political power sharing 
arrangements.  National electoral strategies as well as administrative reforms are also suggested within the context 
of integrative consociationslism.  
 
 
 
Lebanese Governing System and the Crisis of Consociationalism 
 
Lebanon has come to satisfy the conditions under which most consociational 
systems have arisen. In 1943, the Lebanese National Covenant (Al-Methak Al-Watany) 
established corporate consociationalism as the de jure power sharing arrangement 
between the various confessions within the state.  These conditions have been defined as 
the presence of distinct social cleavages, a multiple balance-of-power between the 
various groupings within the country, public attitudes accepting of government by grand 
coalition, a light load on the political system, and a small size that precludes an active 
foreign policy (Jabbra and Jabbra, 2001: 71-77).  
The consociational system allocated the presidency to a Christian Maronite, the 
premiership to a Muslim Sunni, and the Speakership to a Muslim Shi‘ite.  All public 
offices were corporate according to confessional and sectarian affiliations.  They were 
assigned confessions on the proportional principle of 5 Muslims to every 6 appointed 
Christians.  Along the same confessional office-allocation principle, all elected seats of 
the National Assembly were divided. Cabinet ministers and ministry general-directors as 
well as heads of the Armed Forces, the Central Bank, and the National University, among 
other sensitive public positions, were distributed along sectarian lines to accommodate 
the delicate confessional balance.  
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The end result of this corporate consociational division of power has been a self-
perpetuating capture of the state by a political sectarian elite that both lacks national 
accountability and undermines government commitment to the public good. The sectarian 
elite‘s confessional division of power was consolidated by an electoral system that 
undermined non-sectarian and independent challengers.  A plurality list-based majority 
system within districts of a manageable size provided the incumbent confessional elites 
with the ability to trade votes across sectarian lines without necessarily soliciting votes 
from their own social grouping. This factor helped incumbent elite candidates to secure 
electoral victories and left them free to negotiate with other sectarian elites the division of 
public offices and resources. Sectarian elites became indispensible oligopolistic patrons 
to their sectarian cliental constituencies, politically ―inheriting‖ sectarian public offices.  
[This phenomenon is often referred to in Lebanon as ―political feudalism‖ – Al-Ikta’a Al-
Seyasse.  Examples of elite families that inherited political offices across generations are: 
Al-Khazen, Junbulat, Al-Assad, Slam, Tueini, Saad.]  
The political outcome of this arrangement is such that the confessional elites have 
become adept at grasping onto the patronage spoils from a division of the public sector 
pie, trading alliances and allegiances in efforts to maximize their proportion of influence. 
The main consequence of this outcome is that low priority is given to overcoming the 
common and pressing reform issues that challenged the entire country, such as the need 
for economic growth, public accountability, and the rule of law (Salamey and Payne, 
2008).  
The confessional predetermination of state power among many sects, each having 
veto power over public decisions, undermined the realization of a functional and strong 
government system.    Instead, a deeply divided and a weak confessional state was 
established.   The immediate result was a spread of social and political insecurity among 
its citizens, forcing sectarian groups to rely on their own social and security networks, 
and to look for support beyond Lebanon's borders (Hudson, 1968:34). The state, acting as 
a trustee, became notorious for its immobility and its inability to implement policies that 
would promote progress and prevent deterioration (Kerr, 1966: 188). 
As a consequence, the sectarian conflict dynamic was heightened, violent conflict 
followed, and the state repeatedly failed.  The Doha Accord of 2008, brokered by the 
state of Qatar, brought to a halt a short period of sectarian civil strife, but this recent 
episode was only the latest in a series of foreign sponsored initiatives that have 
attempted, in vain, to strengthen the consociational system and undermine its conflictual 
orientations.   
The chronic weak nature of state consociationalism in Lebanon and the continuous 
failure of international efforts to provide a sustainable governing system are attributed to 
short-term agreements that have neither helped accommodate nor moderated political 
sectarianism in the country.  This paper examines the conflictual dynamics of corporate 
consociationalism in an effort to recommend a comprehensible proposition for transition 
and reform of Lebanon‘s governing dilemma. 
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Ethno-Sectarian Consociationalism for a Deeply Divided Society 
 
In plural societies, power sharing is often selected as a mechanism to avert or 
remediate inter-group conflict and violence.  Among the challenges facing power sharing 
formulas is the achievement of a popular majority, while, at the same time, preserving 
groups‘ cultural autonomy (Dodge, 2007; Lipjhart, 1969; Kapoor, 2002).  Traditional 
debate has entailed competing political propositions.  The ―melting pot‖ model rejects 
ethnicity-based power sharing and advocates assimilation toward nationhood (Dodge, 
2007). The multi-cultural and neo-liberal theory models, on the other hand, have 
emphasized diversity and stressed the importance of politically preserving ethnic, 
sectarian, religious, regional, and racial peculiarities and identities (Lijphart, 1969; 
McGarry & O‘Leary, 2007).  
In the late 1960s, Arend Lijphart proposed ethnic-based ―consociational 
democracy‖ as a plausible alternative arrangement for plural societies.  For plural 
societies, he suggested ethnic-based consociationalism as a form of governance defined 
as a ―government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political 
culture into a stable democracy‖ (Lijphart, 1969).  He described a plural society as being 
characterized by deep religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, racial and/or 
ethnic segmental cleavages, having public loyalty fragmented according to representative 
groups rather than being embedded in a single national authority (Lijphart, 1984:22).  He 
characterized consociational democracy as possessing four main political tenets: a grand 
coalition, a mutual veto, proportional representation and segmental autonomy (Lijphart, 
1977:25).  Lijphart has maintained a consistent defense of consociationalism as the 
preferred choice for plural societies, stressing that such an arrangement must guarantee 
equitable power sharing distribution and group autonomy in at least the educational and 
cultural spheres (Lijphart, 2006; 2004; 2002:37).  
However, in various countries, such as Lebanon and Iraq, consociational 
democracy has yielded corporate forms of power sharing that have been referred to as 
‗corporate consociationalism‘ (Hanf, 1981, Lijphart, 2006). Corporate Consociationalism 
predetermines power positions among ethnic and sectarian national groups, such as pre-
determining the Presidency to a Maronite in Lebanon or to a Kurd in Iraq. 
Predetermination of power positions is often extended throughout the various 
representative and administrative institutions of the state.   In Lebanon, as has been 
presented, all elected national offices are allocated on a confessional basis (Salamey & 
Payne, 2008). In both Lebanon and Iraq as well as in various ethnically and sectarian 
divided societies, such as North Ireland and Sudan, power sharing distributions and 
power mandates have been fixed by  unwritten national accords, pacts, or customs, 
making amendments difficult, sometimes impossible, and often risk-laden. 
Ultimately, the corporate consociational power sharing model has been 
confronted, particularly in transitional states, by various extra-national challenges. [For 
various discussions on the meaning of ―transitional state,‖ see Aydinli and Rosenau 
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(2005).] One of the most problematic has been associated with the phenomenon of 
‗deterritorialization‘ and ‗denationalization‘ in the age of globalization, and, by 
implication, the overwhelming interconnectedness of ethno-political factors reaching out 
beyond the borders of the nation-state (Anderson, 2006; Castles & Davidson, 2000; 
Gulalp, 2006; Kerr, 2005; Lake & Rothchild; 1998). In any given national power sharing 
formulation, this has subjected the various ethno-sectarian groups to the direct influences 
of transnational groups and foreign governments (Axtmann, 2004; Kerr, 2005; McGarry 
& O‘Leary, 2006).  A turbulent and interconnected regional environment, such as in Iraq 
and Lebanon, has instigated ethnic groups to fight for the re-distribution of corporatized 
state power.  Under such circumstances, and whenever possible, corporate power 
rearrangements have been re-established to mirror the regional balance of power instead 
of reflecting domestic group interests and sizes.  Thus, such a corporate arrangement has 
set the stage for a permanent domestic struggle.
1
   
Efforts have been made by neo-consociationalists to incorporate various 
institutional and extra-institutional variables into power sharing arrangements. ‗Critical-
consociationalists‘ such as John McGarry and Brendan O‘Leary recognized the role of 
external parties in exacerbating ethnic conflict or facilitating agreement (McGarry & 
O‘Leary, 2006; O‘Leary, 1989).  Similarly, Michael Kerr cites foreign countries‘ 
imposition of power sharing as often being instrumental in the framing of 
‗consociationalism‘ (Kerr, 2005).  McGarry and O‘Leary (2007) have recognized the 
limits of corporate consociationalism in Iraq, and have proposed revising Liphart‘s 
original power sharing formula to allow for loose consociationalism within the 
framework of a ‗federacy‘ in a ‗pluralist federation‘ (McGarry & O‘Leary, 2007; 
O‘Leary, 2005).   
Nonetheless, as has been noted, the geopolitical factor of ethnic 
interconnectedness in power struggle was not the only obstacle confronting neo-
consociationalism. In multi-ethnic developing countries, globalization and modernization 
have paved the way for dramatic intra-national demographic and spatial transformations, 
pitting different groups in direct competition with one another over contested space, 
resources, capital, and foreign support (Davis, 2006).  In turn, foreign intervention in 
groups‘ affairs, coinciding with growing demographic and spatial pressures, further 
polarize ethno-sectarian politics and undermines the consociational state (Salamey & 
Payne, 2008; Salamey & Pearson, 2005, 2007; Salamey & Tabar 2008).  As a 
consequence, the existing cross-cutting sectarian and secular spaces shrink. Confessional 
and ethnic political groups emerge as oppressive or even totalitarian rulers within ethnic 
enclaves, acting as intra-state authoritarian entities (El Khazen, 2003; Salamey & 
Pearson, 2007; Sharrara, 1998). Sectarian cleansing can be turned into a permanent 
process orienting and polarizing the political power struggle in the plural transitional 
state.  
Thus, the rise of ethno-sectarian intra- and inter-national geopolitics presents a 
serious challenge confronting the prospect of the corporate consociational nation-state, 
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with demographic and spatial dynamics forming additional challenges (Bollens; 2001, 
1999).  This paper takes Lebanese consociationalism as a case study to reveal the 
challenges confronting power sharing arrangement.  It demonstrates that the fluidity of 
both space and population in a sectarian plural society renders corporate sectarian-based 
consociationalism an inherently conflict-ridden form of power sharing arrangement.  As 
an alternative, this paper proposes ―integrative consociationalism‖ as a synthetic 
institutional arrangement that can better correspond to the dynamism of modern 
geopolitical plurality. Integrative consociationalism in this paper would endeavor to 
institutionalize representative and administrative arrangements in a way that combines 
local with national interests, allows for cross-cutting cleavage formations and joint group 
activity, and provides for the political duality of the citizen and the community.  
 
 
Demographic Dynamics Undermining Consociationalism 
 
Under the 1943 provisions of the Lebanese National Covenant, a slight advantage 
was given to the Christian groups, in particular the Maronites, over the Muslim 
components of Lebanese society.  This advantage was due to a population census 
conducted in 1932, which recorded a slight majority of Christians, a proportion which has 
since been on the decline as the Muslim population has grown and the Christian 
population has declined (Duwayhe, 2006: 14). Yet the system formula remains 
essentially unchanged, and this demographic dynamic has repeatedly plunged the country 
into national crises and, often, violent confrontations as a sole mean to adjust sectarian 
power distribution. 
Taking the city of Beirut as a case in point, the pattern of communal rural-to-urban 
migration resulting in demographic changes has come to challenge traditional notion of 
confessionalism. Demographic changes coupled with the consociational state‘s 
unresponsiveness and paralysis have resulted in communal grievances and sectarian 
mobilizations.  
In 1960, Greater Beirut‘s population stood at 450,000 residents; by 1975, that 
figure had increased threefold to 1,250,000 (Collelo, 1987). This population boom turned 
Beirut into the most populous city in Lebanon by a vast margin, and it became the place 
where embryonic forms of cross-cutting cleavages emerged (i.e., mixed sectarian 
residential areas, major workers‘ and professional associations). [Beirut is almost five 
times the population of Lebanon‘s second largest city, Tripoli (2007 est.).] This rapid 
expansion of the city‘s population initially favored the growth of the middle class and 
secular neighborhoods where residential and market growth undermined confessional 
demarcations. [Most conservative estimates have placed the contemporary residential 
population of Beirut and its suburbs at 36% of the total population of Lebanon as of 2001 
(Kasparian, 2003).]  
88 Failing Consociationalism in Lebanon and Integrative Options 
 
Corporate confessionalism, however, dictated a primordial rather than a ―modern‖ 
dynamic for such urban areas in the country. The corporate confessional distribution of 
national and local political offices, including municipal posts, required sectarian 
segregation. Compounding the polarization, the poor and emerging working class, 
descending from mainly from rural migrant families, sought residence near their city co-
religionists and co-villagers. For the Shia, being unable to meld in with other sects, the 
pattern was represented in a massive migration allocated in the southern suburbs of 
Beirut (Dahye), later denoted as the suburban "belt of misery." By 1975, deepening 
socio-economic spatial stratification between the primarily affluent Maronite eastern 
suburbs of Beirut and the adjacent poorer Shia southern suburbs led to deep confessional 
resentment between the groups. As a result, it was no coincidence that the first front of 
the 1975 Civil War (the Green Line) stretched between these neighborhoods:  Shia 
Shayah versus Christian Ayn Al-Rummanah, which by the 1980s expanded to separate 
the largely Christian East Beirut from Muslim West Beirut (Collelo, 1987). 
Repeated incursions and invasions by Israel into the largely Shia region of 
southern Lebanon in 1979, 1982, 1993, 1996, and 2006 further drove massive waves of 
Shia rural-to-urban displacement (Nasr & James, 1985; Salamey & Pearson, 2007). These 
events resulted in the forced establishment of massive illegal housing neighborhoods 
(slums) contributing to the further expansion of the southern suburbs of Beirut, at times 
even reaching the airport (Davie, 1993).   By the 1990s, the Shia‘s expansion began soon 
to infiltrate to the city‘s traditionally secular, Christian, Sunni, and Druze neighborhoods. 
[In Beirut, areas such as  Basta, Zkak Al-Bulat, Mousaytbeh, Mazraa, Rawshah, Hamra.  
In suburbs, areas such as Hadath, Harat Herik, Khaldah, Shouwayfat, Na’mah, and so 
forth.]  Gradual demographic gains by the Shia throughout the city became evident. Yet 
the city‘s political municipal allocation of offices and services, as pre-set by the corporate 
confessional system, refused to accommodate the sectarian demographic changes and 
continued to encourage comparative disfranchisement. The representation system did not 
provide new sectarian residents with corresponding municipal or parliamentary seats in 
either Beirut or suburban areas of Mount Lebanon.  The Shia remained without 
proportional representation despite their massive residential population.  
Confessional population shifts challenged the established yet outdated spatial and 
political confessional boundaries. Further acute social and radical sectarian mobilizations 
that disrupted the delicate balance followed soon thereafter (Jabbra & Jabbra, 2001). As 
had appeared before in 1958 and in 1975-1990, an outburst of civil strife and armed 
clashes in the country again appeared as a direct consequence of a deep-rooted division 
between a demographically growing but politically ―deprived‖ sectarian population 
(lately the Shia) and that of presumably politically-advantaged groups (Sunni, Druze, and 
Christians).
2
 In 2006, as a consequence, sectarian tensions in West Beirut and suburbs 
were running high, placing the Shia mainly on one side and the Sunni and Druze on the 
other. The 1975 Civil War front lines that once divided Christians and Muslim 
neighborhoods shifted in 2006-2008 to divide sectarian Muslim neighborhoods (Shia vs. 
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Sunni vs. Druze), with the Lebanese Army and internal security forces standing in 
between.  
The consociational state needed to act to contain sectarian grievances, but it failed 
to do so. The corporate consociational balance of power structure prevented the political 
expression of the newly emerging social forces; political avenues were obstructed by the 
traditional corporate arrangement (Nasr & James, 1985; Shils, 1966) and the static 
consociational edifice was incapable of adapting to a changing demographic sectarian 
environment. In 1958 and 1975, Christians‘ power privileges were at stake against 
demographically-growing Muslim sects.  In 2006, the demographic growth of the Shia, 
particularly in vital urban centers, such as Beirut and its suburbs, and the inability of the 
existing corporate consociational power arrangement to accommodate changing 
demography, were among the major reasons contributing to the series of crises and to the 
eventual outbreak of violent clashes in 2008.
3
  
A public opinion phone survey conducted by the Lebanese American University 
(LAU) in 2008 of 300 randomly selected respondents of voting age residing in Beirut and 
its suburbs captured the demographic basis of the political divide (Salamey & Tabar, 
2008). The survey showed that the ―residential‖ composition of opposing political camps 
was a strong determinant of political affiliation:   supporters of the March 8
th
 alliance (led 
primarily by the Shia) residing in Beirut and its suburbs (Greater Beirut) were 
predominantly found to be of regional origin from outside of Greater Beirut (77%).  In 
contrast, March 14
th
 supporters (led mainly by Sunni and Druze sects) were composed of 
individuals with family origin from Greater Beirut (62%) (Salamey & Tabar, 2007). 
 
 
The Spatial Dilemma of Consociationalism 
 
The permanent sectarian demographic imbalance in Lebanon was echoed by 
spatial relocations, contributing to changing sectarian political advantages.  Access to 
resources, geographic borders, and strategic locations has been decisive in the 
determination of sectarian power advantage. Sectarian spaces became contested, driving 
the sects and their respective sponsoring foreign powers to establish control over vital 
locations, particularly through population concentration around cities and strategic 
locations.  This has eventually led to sectarian cleansing (i.e., forced population 
expulsions), conflicting claims over territory, and disputed history. [There is no 
nationally unified public school history textbook in Lebanon due to sectarian 
disagreement over historic interpretations.] Sectarian consociationalism within the 
corporate confessional state has only weakened the ability of state security and military 
forces to take decisive actions to end sectarian violence or assert territorial state 
sovereignty.  
For instance, the competition over an ever-shrinking urban space in the city of 
Beirut has had dramatic consequences on urban inter-sectarian struggle. As has been 
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discussed, throughout the 1950s, 60s, and early 70s, Beirut grew at an unprecedented 
rate. By the end of the 20
th
 Century, the city and its urban suburbs had attracted almost 
half of the country‘s population (Collelo, 1987).   Massive rural migration presented a 
major challenge to traditional sectarian and mixed sectarian urban neighborhoods, 
catalyzing a rising contention over the sectarian distribution of urban space and state 
resources (Khalaf, 2002).  Most importantly, sects sought to impose their demographic 
dominance in various neighborhoods as a means to assure sectarian political control and 
to force corporate advantages in the consociational confessional power distribution 
(Gebhardt, et al.; 2005). [Displays of posters for sectarian leaders, martyrs, political 
slogans as well as the presence of religious institutions and sectarian political offices 
have served as territorial trenches demarking sectarian neighborhoods.]  
These led to major sectarian cleansing campaigns throughout Beirut 
neighborhoods during times of crises and strife. Sectarian massacres during the Civil War 
of 1975 spread throughout the country in sectarian purification drives.  Major routes and 
highways, ports, airports, strategic mountains, hills, border crossings, markets, and 
industrial, agricultural, and tourist areas became subject to frequent and violent struggle 
for control.  Altering the demographic sectarian distribution of vital areas becomes the 
subject of wide spreading conspiracies.  
In 2007, the Druze leader Walid Jumblat repeatedly accused Shia Hezbollah of 
trying to purchase, with Iranian funding, large swaths of real-estate in various areas of 
Lebanon with the aim of changing its demographic composition and controlling strategic 
military locations in the country.  Likewise, throughout the 1990s, the late Sunni 
billionaire and former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was often accused by other competing 
sects of conspiring to establish Sunni control over the Beirut downtown commercial 
center through major reconstruction and real-estate venture, known as Solidere.  In post-
1975 period, Shia groups have been accused of building illegal housing projects and 
slums surrounding the country‘s only airport as a way of controlling its destiny, using this 
as a bargaining leverage against other sects. [See civil unrest and armed ―insurgency‖ in 
May 2008, where Hezbollah blockaded airport‘s roads in its drive to tease out political 
concession from the pro-government sectarian groups. The predominantly Sunni Future 
Movement responded by blockading major Lebanese-Syrian border crossing in Sunni 
controlled towns.]  
Throughout these events, the corporate confessional state appeared unable to 
respond to the sectarian geopolitical struggle. Collective sectarian consociationalism over 
state action was a prerequisite.  As a consequence, the state failed to intervene, to 
mediate, or to channel sectarian conflict over contested regions and neighborhoods. Small 
sectarian armed bands were able to protect ―illegal‖ activities of followers, sectarian 
religious authorities were ready to mobilize worshipers, and sectarian politicians assured 
veto over state actions.    
Worse, through the institution of blocking coalitions, consociationalism provided 
any sect with the ability to prevent the state from establishing control over regions 
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deemed vital to sectarian activities. After all, sectarian geopolitical advantage was most 
crucially determined by the strategic spatial location of the sect vis-à-vis bordering states.  
For instance, the Shia, under varying leadership, and, by  virtue of their geographic 
location along the Israeli-Lebanese border, have come to play a vital role in the Arab-
Israeli and Iranian-Israeli struggles, which has elevated their proxy regional geopolitical 
significance.  During the 1970s and 1980s, the Shia provided the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization groups with a safe corridor to wage guerrilla warfare against Israel.  The 
Shia-Palestinian alliance strengthened the Shia-Sunni position in the Lebanese 
confessional struggle, with the PLO providing money, military training, weapons, and 
support that allowed them to wage a successful campaign against the Maronite 
Christians.
4
  
The growing regional rivalry between Iran and Israel in the 1990s provided the 
Lebanese Shia with a significant strategic role in this regional struggle.  The Shia‘s 
campaign against Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon was backed by substantial 
Iranian-Syrian logistical military and financial support, providing Hezbollah with a wide 
military and social network throughout its areas of control. This strategic dominance of 
the Southern region motivated Hezbollah to prevent other sects, parties, and the state 
from sharing control and of developing the constituency. [Hezbollah was forced to accept 
the positioning of the Lebanese Army along the Lebanese-Israeli border for the first time 
since the 1975 only after the Israeli military attack against Lebanon in July 2006 and the 
passage of UNSCR 1701.]  Iranian support of Hezbollah has driven other sects to fear the 
mounting power of the Shia in the country. This fear was further elevated in 2008 after 
Hezbollah utilized its armament advantage to move militarily against other sectarian 
areas. [Following Hezbollah‘s May 2008 armed  insurgency against the government and 
its conquest of predominantly Sunni residential West Beirut, Hezbollah forced electoral 
reform that undermined the power of other sects; particularly the Sunnis and Druze (See 
Doha Declaration).]  
The corporate consociational structure of the state that allowed sectarian groups to 
hold semi-veto power over national decisions was a decisive factor in the establishment 
of safe sectarian enclaves.  The consociational state‘s impingement on these territories 
were often considered as violations of the national pact and labeled as an attack on 
sectarian coexistence (Al-Aysh Al-Moushtarak) by subjected sectarian groups. The state‘s 
efforts to impose itself above narrow sectarian interests in favor of ―national interests‖ 
drew mainly condemnation and violent confrontations especially among the Muslim 
factions.
5
 Thus, the state‘s monopoly over the use of force and its ability to practice an 
equal application of the law over its territories were further undermined.  Amid an 
immobile territorially-based consociational state, a permanent sectarian race for 
armaments and external support has been established throughout the Lebanese territories 
(Traboulsi, 2007).  The chronic failure of the consociational state to act as a law and 
order provider for all its citizens over the entire country‘s territory has become a factor 
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further deepening and fueling the sectarian fragmentation and instability of the country 
and society (Hutson et al., 2009).
6
  
In sum, the sectarian struggle over spatial positioning has pitted different sects in 
competition with one another over vital locations throughout the country. Demographic 
and spatial sectarian reconfigurations within cities, border areas, and strategic locations 
were among the critical factors that have fueled sectarian conflicts. Tying communities‘ 
spatial locations to the domestic sectarian competition for power, and, consequently, to 
regional politics amid the existing weak and paralyzed corporate consociational sectarian 
state renders plurality a conflict ridden reality in a transitional society. 
 
 
Failing Corporate Consociational State in Time of Regional Turbulence 
 
Sectarian power struggle has driven sects to seek foreign backing and support in 
order to balance against one another.  Foreign players have been active in supporting 
their respective allies among the different sects to achieve advantageous geo-strategic 
positions.  As a consequence, for the past half century, the Muslim groups have sought 
the support of the Arab/Muslim World while the Christians relied on their Western allies.  
Whenever Arab/Muslim-Western relations improved, state consociationalism in Lebanon 
thrived, and whenever it deteriorated, state consociationalism collapsed. With the 
growing complexity of contemporary regional power struggles, politics in Lebanon have 
become further fragmented along sectarian lines, pitting different Muslim and Christian 
groups against each other with the consociational state seeking a refereeing role at best.  
Originally, the rise of Nassir in Egypt and the spread of his pan-Arab, anti-western 
ideology in the 1950s deeply divided Lebanese confessional politics, contributing to the 
first Civil War of 1958.  Confessional groups mobilized, with Western-backed Christian 
groups confronting predominantly Islamic factions supported by the Egyptian-Syrian 
nationalist regimes. Similar polarization was ignited again in 1975 and led to a second 
Civil War, with Muslim groups taking the side of the Palestinians in their struggle for 
nationhood while Christians aligning themselves with the West (Traboulsi, 2007).
7 
Today, confessional politics continues to be driven by regional struggle.  Mobilizations 
are being primarily drawn along sectarian lines with pro-Iranian-Syrian Shia groups, led 
by Hezbollah, pitted against a Sunni-led coalition, backed by France, Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt, and the United States. Christians, taking the sideline of the growing regional Shia-
Sunni rivalry, have been evenly divided between Shia and Sunni allies (Beydoun, 2009).
8
 
Sectarian coalition formations and shifts have been largely tempered by domestic power 
struggle as well as by external-regional circumstances, making Lebanese politics 
fundamentally transnational. 
A seasoned political observer can easily forecast the prospect for stability in the 
Lebanese power sharing arrangement and sectarian alliances based upon regional politics.  
For instance, the Ta‘ef Agreement, which enabled the end of the 1975-1989 Lebanese 
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Civil War, was achieved only after the establishment of an anti-Saddam Hussein 
international alliance. It included Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, France, and the United 
States, and received the blessing of the Islamic Republic of Iran, collectively prompting 
international support for Syrian ―guardianship‖ over Lebanon.  The post-Gulf War I 
period witnessed relative stability among the confessional groups in Lebanon and a 
revival of the confessional consociational state.  
Following 9/11 and the beginning of the ‗war on terror‘ by the Bush 
administration, and the subsequent U.S. invasion of Iraq, the post-Gulf War I alliance 
collapsed.  Syrian opposition to the U.S. invasion in 2003 undermined Syrian-U.S. 
relations and drove Syria to align itself even more closely with Shia Iran.  Following the 
2003 invasion of Iraq, the United States envisioned a democratic domino effect in the 
region, launching a Middle Eastern democratic agenda known as ―the Greater Middle 
East Initiative‖ (Baroudi, 2007). This initiated an increase of pressure on Syria for 
‗regime change‘, and was reflected in the U.S. call for an end to Syria‘s political 
―guardianship‖ over Lebanon.  U.S. pressure on Syria was enshrined in law after 
President Bush signed The Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration 
Act of 2003, which imposed various economic and political sanctions against the Syrian 
regime for its alleged support of Hezbollah (Public Law, 2003). This Act called on Syria 
to ―immediately declare its commitment to completely withdraw its armed forces, 
including military, paramilitary, and security forces, from Lebanon, and set a firm 
schedule for such withdrawal‖ (The Syria Accountability…, 2003).  Sensing U.S. resolve, 
anti-Syrian confessional groups in Lebanon, mainly Maronite, Druze, and Sunni, initiated 
a campaign against the Syrian presence in Lebanon (known as ―the Bristol Gathering‖).  
They were opposed by pro-Syrian groups, led primarily by the Shia (assembled around 
―the Ain Al-Tenah Camp‖).  The consociational confessional state emerged divided and 
on the verge of collapse. 
By the end of 2004, relations between Syria, on the one side, and Western powers, 
primarily France and the U.S. as well as pro-Western Sunni Arab states such as Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt, on the other side, further deteriorated, with the latter accusing Syria of 
supporting the anti-American insurgency in Iraq as well as arming Shia Hezbollah in 
Lebanon.  Syria responded by implementing an extraconstitutional measure that extended 
pro-Syrian president Emile Lahoud‘s term in office for an additional three years. In turn, 
the U.S., France, and the U.K. reacted by passing U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559,  
demanding the immediate withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and the 
disarmament of pro-Syrian and pro-Iranian Palestinian and Shia groups such as 
Hezbollah. What followed was the commencement of a retaliatory campaign of violence 
against anti-Syrian dissidents, most notably the assassination of the former Prime 
Minister of Lebanon and Sunni leader, Rafik Hariri. 
The Hariri assassination plunged the confessional state into a deeper sectarian 
crisis.  The Shia factions were backed by Iran and Syria, while Maronite, Druze, and 
Sunni groups were supported by the U.S., France, and Saudi Arabia.  Political divisions 
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were created between the pro-Syrian ―March 8th Coalition,‖ on one side, and the anti-
Syrian ―March 14th Coalition,‖ on the other.  Massive international pressure succeeded in 
forcing Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2005 and in holding national 
parliamentary elections in Lebanon.  Yet, such a pressure, amid deep sectarian division, 
failed to revive or even stabilize the corporate consociational state (Baroudi & Salamey, 
2008; Salamey and Payne, 2008). 
Violence campaigns against anti-Syrian leaders resumed. By December 2006, the 
newly forged coalition between the Shia group Hezbollah and the Maronite Christian 
leader Michael Aoun orchestrated a popular campaign to topple the March 14
th
 
dominated cabinet and parliament.
9
  This began with the resignation of pro-Syrian Shia 
ministers from the cabinet in November 2006, followed by the initiation of a massive 
year-long sit-in in downtown Beirut surrounding the Cabinet House, the refusal to 
recognize the legitimacy or constitutionality of the existing Cabinet on grounds of lacking 
consociationalism, the blocking of parliament from convening or inaugurating a new 
president, and finally the leading of an armed insurgency in the capital during May 2008. 
International efforts to aid the March 14
th
 cabinet and parliament, primarily from 
the U.S., France, and Saudi Arabia, proved futile in the face of Syrian-Iranian-backed 
opposition and sectarian veto. Finally, both France and Saudi Arabia began to yield to the 
notion that the prospect of the corporate consociational state in Lebanon cannot be 
achieved without the direct support and approval of Syria, Iran, and their Lebanese 
sectarian allies. For that purpose, France and Saudi Arabia began requesting Syrian and 
Iranian assistance to pressure Lebanese allies to work together and elect a new president 
ahead of forming a new ‗national unity‘ cabinet. This led the Arab League in May 2008 
to yield the diplomatic initiative to the presumably ―neutral‖ state of Qatar in settling the 
Lebanese sectarian crisis (see Doha Declaration).  
The recent political developments in Lebanon, particularly sectarian 
compradorialism and international proxy roles played out by competing client groups, 
demonstrate that the achievement of state sectarian consociationalism is largely 
contingent upon the consensus of regional and international powers. At the same time, 
the consociational sectarian prerequisites of the state‘s structure and decision making 
have proven conducive to foreign intervention in power sharing arrangement and regional 
power struggle over Lebanese territories.  The viability and stability of a sectarian based 
consociational state has proven difficult, if not impossible, to be achieved amid the 
turbulent regional and international political environment. 
 
 
Integrative Consociationalism 
 
As has been discussed, the Lebanese example shows that geopolitical 
interconnectivity and the fluidity of both space and demography paralyze the corporate 
sectarian-based consociational state that, in turn, leads to groups reverting to local and 
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exclusionary sectarian control and foreign affiliations.  Thus, the preservation of peaceful 
and coexisting plurality within a corporate consociational power sharing context has been 
highly contested.  
While deep ethno-sectarian identity is a reality determining the political prospects 
of many plural societies, appropriate consociational power sharing arrangement may 
undermine splintering momentum, foreign allegiance, and national fragmentation.  While 
deep ethno-sectarian identity is a reality determining the political prospects of many 
plural societies, an appropriate consociational power sharing arrangement could help to 
undermine the splintering of momentum, the formation of foreign allegiances, and 
national fragmentation. Such an arrangement needs, however, to solicit political 
accommodation so as to encourage the formation of cross-cutting socio-political 
cleavages rather than the contrary (Lipset, 1959).
10
 Integrative consociationalism is 
proposed here as an institutional formulation that injects political stimulation and 
incentives for inter-sectarian accommodation and cross-cutting cleavage formation.  It is 
suggested that such a strategy synthesizes national and sectarian-based power sharing 
arrangements through combining democratic proportional rule with that of sectarian 
consociationalism. Such a mechanism promises to help moderate deep sectarian divisions 
in favor of inter and cross-cutting cleavages politics. 
The implementation of integrative consociationalism can be achieved through 
political reforms that institutionalize secular ―self-determination‖ alongside communal 
sectarian ―predetermination‖ as a principled guide.  Arend Lijphart explained ―self-
determination‖ as a conciliatory power sharing proposition between ethnic and non-
ethnic groups and individuals (Lijphart, 2006:285).  Consociationalism based on ‗self-
determination‘ makes confessional group membership optional rather than pre-
determined (Hanf, 1981: 249).  The electoral implications of such a proposition include 
the establishment of ethno-sectarian alongside non-ethno-sectarian elected offices. 
Applying these recommendations within a diverse ethno-sectarian and divided society 
requires resolutions that stress political inclusion of individual citizenry without 
undermining ethno-sectarian communalism (Burkholder, 2006; Khalaf, 2001: 43-44).  
Lessons from countries with fluid, interactive, and dynamic cleavages that have 
relatively succeeded in institutionalizing political formulas to moderate divisions and 
accommodate fast changing demography should be revealing.  Many diverse immigrant-
based societies, for instance, have institutionalized integrative governing strategies to 
cope with fast changing demographic and spatial landscapes (―New World‖ countries 
such as Canada and Australia).  Many rapidly industrialized and urbanized states have 
also institutionalized successful integrative mechanisms that helped preserve the dual 
interests of the citizenry and that of the emerging communities. 
At least four important institutional arrangements can be formulated along 
integrative consociational principles: bicameralism, duality of administrative local and 
national governance, mixed electoral system, and cross-cutting electoral districting. 
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The establishment of bicameral representation along with a responsive electoral 
system is one of the keys to integrative consociationalism.  The United States, Germany, 
Russia, and Australia among others have successfully implemented aspects of integrative 
consociationalism. In each case, the lower chamber has come to represent the individual 
citizenry especially in small districts or at large, while the upper chamber has preserved 
the geographic interests of states, communities, and regions.  A combination of 
centralized and decentralized administrations has also helped achieve duality of interests 
between the national and local levels of governance.  Appropriate electoral mechanisms 
(e.g., majoritarian, plurality, proportional, or mixed) along corresponding electoral 
districts have stimulated alliances and cross-cutting cleavage formations. 
In principle, Lebanon has made important moves toward integrative 
consociationalism. The Lebanese Ta‘ef Agreement of 1989 stipulated the creation of a 
bicameral chamber: a Chamber of Deputies elected directly by the Lebanese citizens on a 
national non-sectarian ―self-determination‖ basis, and a Senate that maintains ―pre-
determined‖ sectarian representation.  The Ta‘ef Agreement also recommended the 
further decentralization of government administrations. [The 1989 Ta‘ef Agreement that 
sought to end the Lebanese Civil War stipulated the eventual establishment of a 
bicameral representation, a confessionally-based Upper House or a Senate along with a 
non-confessionally-based Lower House or a Chamber of Deputies (See The 1989 Ta‘ef 
Agreement).] However, due to strong sectarian elite objections, Lebanon failed to 
implement such a bicameral and administrative arrangement.  
The implementation of bicameral representation in Lebanon would constitute an 
important electoral element in integrative consociationalism. Bicameral representation 
allows the individual voter to express dual identities; sectarian representation is vested in 
the upper house while national citizenship is manifested in the secular vote to the lower 
house. Sectarian seats in the upper house can be allocated in proportion to the 
confessional constituencies in the country, as they are allocated today in the Lebanese 
Chamber of Deputies. Each ethnic or sectarian group would elect their respective 
representatives.  
Administrative aspects of integrative consociationalism have also been  introduced 
by the Ta‘ef Agreement to complement bicameral reforms.  The Agreement stipulates the 
implementation of a strong centralism alongside decentralism (See Ta‘ef Agreement - 
―III. Other Reforms: Administrative Decentralism‖). Yet neither has been possible to 
implement amid the lack of a comprehensive and integrative reform.  Within the 
corporate consociational state, centralism has been repeatedly sabotaged by sectarian 
vetoes while decentralism has been manipulated so as to strengthen sectarian 
totalitarianism and fragmentation.
11
 Through bicameralism, however, integration of 
centralized and decentralized interests (sectarian and regional) makes such administration 
mutually inclusive as is the case with many federal arrangements.  
Another integrative consociational attempt had been made by the National 
Electoral Commission (also known as the ‗Boutrous Commission‘), which was set up by 
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Lebanese Chamber of Deputies in 2005and recommended the establishment of an 
electoral system that combines aspects of majoritarianism and proportional representation 
(National Commission on the Parliamentary Electoral Law, 2006).  Such a system, if it 
were to have been adopted, would have combined local sectarian representation in small 
plurality at large (bloc voting) based districts (Qaza) with cross-cutting representation of 
cleavages in larger multi-member proportional list-based districts (Mouhafazah) (see 
Illustration Manual by the National Commission on the Parliamentary Electoral Law, 
2006). The Commission‘s recommendations, however, were rejected by self-perpetuating 
confessional elites meeting in Doha, who, alternatively, proposed small-plurality at large 
districts with seats predetermined along sectarian lines (see Doha Declaration).  
Electoral districting and the formation of electoral rules would play a significant 
role in fostering national cross-cutting cleavages politics in Lebanon.  The size of each 
electoral district, its ethno-sectarian composition, the number of contested national seats, 
and the number and size of parties are important determinants to consider when designing 
the electoral system and its corresponding districts (Harris & Reilly, 1998). Ideally, the 
implementation of proportional representation (PR), particularly for a lower house, would 
have been an integrative electoral option.  The PR system provides incentives for parties 
to establish cross-cutting sectarian alliances to form a governing coalition.  Yet, despite 
its attractiveness for the lower house (particularly the PR variant known as List 
Proportional Representation – LPR as implemented in Israel), Iraq‘s experience stands as 
stark evidence of various deficiencies inherent in the LPR system for deeply divided 
societies undergoing transition. The absence of a large dominant or strong national party, 
the presence of a large number of contested seats for the National Assembly within a 
single national electoral district, the existence of deep ethnic and sectarian divisions, the 
low electoral threshold, and the lack of a unifying national leadership has yielded a 
system of numerous polarized parties of small and medium size. The result has been the 
deep fragmentation of the voters along ethnic, sectarian, regional, and tribal lines, and, 
consequently, the undermining state‘s unity and stability (Salamey & Pearson, 2005).12   
In contrast, the Lebanese bloc vote electoral system has changed over the years 
following violent events.  The politics of redistricting and gerrymandering has shaped the 
confessional realignment and power sharing distribution, yielding mixed results.
13
 Large 
multi-member multi-sectarian-constituency bloc electoral list districts (the ‗muhafaza‘ or 
province) had been implemented in Lebanon between 1990 and 2005, during the period 
of Syrian ‗gaurdianship‘, yielding ‗relative‘ integrative consociational outcomes. Most 
importantly, in close races, these districts have dictated the formation of cross-cutting 
sectarian lists  throughout the electoral process. Candidates have been forced to moderate 
their sectarian appeal in favor of coexistence (Al-Aysh Al-Moushtarak) to win cross-
cutting sectarian votes. This has been particularly the case in districts with no single 
sectarian majority (Mount Lebanon, North Lebanon, Western Bekaa Valley).  In single 
sectarian dominated districts, however, integration has been undermined (South Lebanon, 
Nabateya, Beirut, and Chouf) where sectarian minority votes rendered insignificant 
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(Hutson et al., 2009).  Yet, the most important integrative deficiency revealed throughout 
this electoral experience lies in the pre-determination of quota-based sectarian seats that 
have fueled conflict during times of demographic dynamics and change, emphasizing 
exclusionary rather than integrative consociationalism (Salamey & Payne, 2008).  
Integrative lessons drawn from the electoral system in Lebanon strongly point to 
the need to establish mid-to-large multi-member multi-ethnic/sectarian electoral districts. 
List Proportional Representation is a preferred electoral-system choice because it can 
better represent the changing ethno-sectarian demography and preserve minority 
representation.  At the same time, a multi-member bloc vote system in sectarian mixed 
and close-race districts has the advantage of fostering cross-cleavage alliances. A mixed 
system that combines the advantages is the preferred choice.  The German electoral 
system can be taken as a mixed-model, where the election ballot for the Bundestag 
provides the voter with the ability to select a competing electoral list, i.e., List 
Proportional Representation (LPR), as well as candidates running on plurality electoral 
basis.  Thus, districting considerations must be taken into account in order to establish a 
relative ethno-sectarian electoral balance whenever possible, particularly in mixed cities, 
suburbs, and provinces, so as to boost integrative electoral process.   
Contrary to what the current system dictates, the electoral reform proposed above 
assures self-determination and makes confessional and secular identification voluntary 
rather than ―pre-determined.‖  Electoral proportional representation provides an internal 
corrective mechanism whenever demographic and spatial changes occur.  ―Balanced‖ 
majoritarianism undermines ethno-sectarian polarization by necessitating cross-cutting 
ethno-sectarian alliance formation at various levels in the country, hence tempering the 
likelihood of regional intervention.  Bicameralism along with a combination of 
centralized and decentralized administration establishes the groundwork for the duality of 
communal (sectarian) and individual (national) representation and governance.  This re-
establishment of power distribution along the lines of integrative consociationalism in 
Lebanon paves the way for the moderation of the present conflictual inter-sectarian 
struggle. 
As has been examined, Lebanese corporatist consociationalism has converged 
domestic and regional geopolitical struggles.  It has tethered national sectarian dynamics 
to regional geopolitics. Confessional groups have sought affiliations with foreign 
countries and drew substantial foreign backing. Yet, despite the various benefits that 
regional powers have gained by the proxy roles played out by Lebanese sectarian groups, 
sectarian conflicts have repeatedly threatened to spill over to the entire region. Sunni-
Shia struggle in Lebanon has alarmed the entire group of Arab states, particularly those 
with divided constituencies such as Syria and the Gulf countries.  International powers 
have also been alarmed by the threat of growing sectarian conflicts and instabilities in the 
region (Iraq, Sudan, Pakistan, Yemen, and so forth). Lebanese sectarian elites themselves 
have feared open sectarian civil war that would undermine their controls and strategic 
regional role.   
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The threat of open conflict and civil war has provided a strong incentive for 
sectarian elites to negotiate political reform and settlement and to reach agreement 
(Rustow, 1969). It was no coincidence that during the May of 2008 breakout of sectarian 
Sunni-Shi‘ite strife in Lebanon, regional countries rushed to end the disputes and 
facilitated incentives for the Lebanese sectarian elites to reach the Doha Agreement.  
Such convergence of regional and local concerns provides an important opportunity for 
reform initiatives to gain momentum and for cross-cutting ethno-sectarian integrative 
arrangements to be advanced. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The dilemma surrounding ethno-sectarian accommodation in Lebanon remains 
typical of many deeply-divided transitional countries undergoing rapid demographic and 
spatial changes, amid heavy geopolitical and regional interdependence.  Demographic 
and spatial community dynamics, along with the existing static corporate state system, 
are setting in motion a conflict dynamic that is repeatedly undermining group co-
existence and sustainable relations, and also inviting foreign meddling in the country.  
The fundamental challenge continues to be in addressing what type of power sharing 
arrangement could accommodate the aspirations of the various groups, moderate the 
likelihood and impact of external intervention, avoid internal splintering, and achieve 
equitable and sustainable individual and community justice. 
Despite limits to electoral engineering in the formulation of a sustainable 
democracy in a divided society (Salloukh, 2006), integrative consociational electoral 
reform is needed.     Fundamental to such reform, however, is the achievement of group 
accommodation, citizenship rights, and national integration.  Such an arrangement, 
particularly in countries confronting transition, must account demographically, spatially, 
and politically for the social fluidity of the national environment.   
An examination of confessionalism in Lebanon and current ethno-sectarianism in 
Iraq reveals grave consequences for the rigid, corporate consociational and ethno-
sectarian-based power sharing arrangement that refuses to adapt to a rapidly changing 
national environment and fails to immunize the country from regional interventionism.  
These arrangements require serious revision if they are to achieve sustainable ethno-
sectarian national relations.   
In this article, integrative consociationalism through bicameralism, electoral and 
administrative institutional reforms has been advanced as a synthetic transformational 
representation model that can preserve sectarian communal interests while, at the same 
time, integrate the hybridization of permanently-changing communities and individual 
citizenship.  The integrative consociational option will moderate sectarian appeal in favor 
of sectarian cross-cutting cleavage formations. Through such a transformation, the 
existing contentions between communities and citizens will be reduced. National 
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cohesion and political integration will be preserved and the impact of a turbulent and 
transnational environment contained. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. The examination of the Lebanese political experience demonstrates that the various political pacts at different 
time oversized the power of one sectarian group over others in the corporate arrangements.  This can well be 
associated with regional countries intervening in favor of proxy sect (France in favor of Christians in 1943, Egypt in 
favor of Sunnis in 1958, Syria and Saudi Arabia in favor of Muslims in 1989, Iran in favor of Shia in 2008). 
2. At different periods of the sectarian struggles, superstructure ideological pretexts justified political 
mobilizations.  In 1958 Sunni gathered around Pan-Arab Nasserist sentiments against Christians who supported a 
non-Arab Lebanese nationalist identity.  In 1975, both Sunni and Shia mobilized around the Palestinian cause 
against primarily the Maronites who opposed growing Palestinian military and political role in the country.  Starting 
in 2005 most Christians formed alliance with Sunnis and Druze in support of a Lebanese sovereign and independent 
state against the Shia who defended Hezbollah‘s armed Islamic resistance movement.  
3. In May 2008, armed clashes broke out in Beirut between Shia Hezbollah and Amal militias, on one side, and 
Sunni and Druze militia groups, on the other side.  The Lebanese Army and government security forces were 
paralyzed and prevented from interfering for fear that such an intervention may divide the military and security 
establishment along sectarian lines.  This is the same pretext given in the eve of the outbreak of 1975 Civil War for 
the army and internal security apparatus non-intervention stance in intersectarian violence. 
4. In the early years of the Lebanese Civil War, most young Shia fighters were mobilized by anti-government anti-
Maronite secular parties under the umbrella of the Lebanese National Movement.  With increasing sectarian 
mobilization and radicalization, however, most Shia began to join the ranks of the Amal Movement and later 
Hezbollah.  Since 2005, both Shia groups have sought alliance to counterbalance Sunni political power in the 
country. 
5. In February 2008 the Lebanese cabinet deemed illegal the security-based communication network established 
by Hezbollah in the South and considered it as a violation of state‘s national sovereignty.  This infamous decision, 
along with the removal of a pro-Hezbollah Lebanese Army commander from a senior role in Airport security, led to 
nation-wide armed clashes and ceased only after the Cabinet, in humiliation, reversed itself on both decisions. 
6. Population studies have indicated an overwhelming public support for state‘s monopoly over security, yet 
armed sectarian groups, such as Hezbollah, have prevented the implementation of such public sentiments. For 
instance, the Hutson‘s 2008 survey study of Hezbollah-controlled South Lebanon found that 76% of respondents 
believed only the Lebanese Army and no other actors should bear arms (Hutson et al., 2009). 
7. It should be noted that Syria with its Alawi leaders initially feared the Palestinian-Lebanese Sunni alliance in 
Lebanon and in 1976 intervened militarily in the Lebanese Civil War, with the blessing of Western powers, to back 
the Christian Maronites against Palestinian-Lebanese Muslim alliance.  This position soon shifted after Egypt signed 
a U.S. sponsored peace agreement with Israel (Camp David Accord in 1978), which was opposed by the Arab and 
Syrian regimes. 
8. Christians, and particularly the Maronite leaders, have been deeply divided between allies to Shiite Hezbollah-
led coalition (Aoun-Skaff-Franjeyah) and allies to Sunni Future Movement (Jajaa, Jemayel, Shamoun). 
9. Aoun‘s defection to the Shiite camp can be attributed to the increasing fear of some Christians form potential 
Sunni political dominance and Christian marginalization.  This fear has been infuriated following the Taef 
Agreement, which re-delegated the power of the Maronite President in favor of the Sunni Prime Minister. 
10. Seymour Martin Lipset considered that the chances for a stable democracy ―are enhanced to the extent that 
social strata, groups and individuals have a number of cross-cutting politically relevant affiliations.‖ Additionally, he 
believed that the presence of such a factor will help reduce the intensity of political conflict (Lipset, 1959:97). 
11. Efforts to advance central institutions, such as strengthening the army, have often been viewed suspiciously by 
sectarian groups. Shia Hezbollah has often vetoed such efforts when support for them came from the United States. 
In contrast, the Sunni-led Future Movement has Iranian aids.  On the other hand, decentralism has meant 
strengthening sectarian territorial control over national authority, such as in predominantly Shia Southern Lebanon 
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and Southern Suburbs of Beirut where Hezbollah established a nascent sectarian state. Similar efforts have been 
made by Sunnis in Western Beirut neighborhoods, such as Tarik Al-Jadidah, and in Northern Lebanon. 
12. It should be noted that the ability of a strong national leader at the head of the executive branch may help to 
undermine coalition instability as has been the case in Israel under the various strong national leaders (Sharon, 
Begin, Ben Gurion, etc.).  However, most executive national leaders that emerged in countries such as Iraq and who 
were able to unify the country (e.g., Ataturk, Nassir, Mandela, etc…) came to prominence by their assertion of 
national identity against ―foreign‖ dominance. 
13. The major achievement of the Doha Agreement of May 2008 between the various Lebanese sectarian groups 
was the restoration of the 1960s electoral system, which divided the country into small districts (Qaza), with major 
implications for sectarian and political realignment and political power sharing distribution. 
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